In statistical learning, a dataset is o en partitioned into two parts: the training set and the holdout (i.e., testing) set. For instance, the training set is used to learn a predictor, and then the holdout set is used for estimating the accuracy of the predictor on the true distribution. However, o en in practice, the holdout dataset is reused and the estimates tested on the holdout dataset are chosen adaptively based on the results of prior estimates, leading to that the predictor may become dependent of the holdout set. Hence, over ing may occur, and the learned models may not generalize well to the unseen datasets. Prior studies have established connections between the stability of a learning algorithm and its ability to generalize, but the traditional generalization is not robust to adaptive composition. Recently, Dwork et al. in NIPS, STOC, and Science 2015 show that the holdout dataset from i.i.d. data samples can be reused in adaptive statistical learning, if the estimates are perturbed and coordinated using techniques developed for di erential privacy, which is a widely used notion to quantify privacy. Yet, the results of Dwork et al. are applicable to only the case of i.i.d. samples. In contrast, correlations between data samples exist because of various behavioral, social, and genetic relationships between users. Our results in adaptive statistical learning generalize the results of Dwork et al. for i.i.d. data samples to arbitrarily correlated data. Speci cally, we show that the holdout dataset from correlated samples can be reused in adaptive statistical learning, if the estimates are perturbed and coordinated using techniques developed for Bayesian di erential privacy, which is a privacy notion recently introduced by Yang et al. in SIGMOD 2015 to broaden the application scenarios of di erential privacy when data records are correlated.
INTRODUCTION
In many statistical learning algorithms, a common practice is to partition a dataset into two parts: the training set and the holdout (i.e., testing) set. For instance, a er the training set is used to learn a predictor, the holdout set is used for estimating the accuracy of the predictor on the true distribution. However, in many practical applications, since (i) the holdout dataset is reused, and (ii) the estimates tested on the holdout dataset are chosen adaptively based on the results of prior estimates, we observe that the predictor may become dependent of the holdout set. is leads to the result that over ing may occur, and the learned models may not generalize well to the unseen datasets. Several papers [7, 29, 31, 35] in the literature have established connections between the stability of a learning algorithm and its ability to generalize, but the traditional generalization is not robust to adaptive composition [3, 10, 13] . To remedy this issue, Dwork et al. [12] [13] [14] recently show that the holdout dataset from i.i.d. data samples can be reused in adaptive statistical learning, if the estimates are perturbed and coordinated using techniques developed for di erential privacy, which has emerged as the standard notion to quantify privacy and will be elaborated next.
Di erential privacy by Dwork et al. [11, 16] is a privacy notion that has been successfully applied to a range of statistical learning tasks, since it o ers a rigorous foundation for de ning privacy. Di erential privacy has received considerable interest in the literature [4, 27, 36, 40, 41, 43] .
e Chrome browser by Google has used a di erentially private tool called RAPPOR [18] to collect information about clients. Starting from iOS 10, Apple [1] has incorporated di erential privacy into its mobile operating system. A randomized mechanism Y satis es ϵ-di erential privacy if for all neighboring databases x and x that di er in one record, and for any subset Y of the output range of the mechanism Y , it holds that P[Y (x ) ∈ Y] ≤ e ϵ P[Y (x ) ∈ Y], where P[·] denotes the probability and e is a mathematical constant that is the base of the natural logarithm. Intuitively, under di erential privacy, an adversary given access to the output does not have much con dence to determine whether the output was sampled from the probability distribution generated by the randomized algorithm when the database is x or when the database is x that is di erent from x by one record.
Dwork et al. [12] [13] [14] show that the holdout dataset from i.i.d. data samples can be reused in adaptive statistical learning, if the estimates are perturbed and coordinated using algorithms satisfying di erential privacy. ese e orts by Dwork et al. [12] [13] [14] have a racted signi cant a ention to adaptive statistical learning [3, 5, 10, 33, 34] . However, existing studies for adaptive statistical learning including those of Dwork et al. [12] [13] [14] are applicable to only the case of i.i.d. samples. In contrast, correlations between data samples exist because of various behavioral, social, and genetic relationships between users [44] . In location privacy, a user's locations across time exhibit temporal correlations [30, 38, 41] , and locations of friends tend to have social correlations since they are likely to visit the same place [2, 26] . In genome privacy, DNA information is passed from parents to children based on Mendelian inheritance so family members' genotypes are correlated, where a genotype is the set of genes in DNA responsible for a particular trait [21] . In short, real-world data samples may contain a rich set of correlations.
Our results in adaptive statistical learning generalize recent work of Dwork et al. [12] [13] [14] for i.i.d. data samples to arbitrarily correlated data. In other words, we tackle adaptive statistical learning with correlated data samples while Dwork et al. [12] [13] [14] consider only i.i.d. samples. Speci cally, we show that the holdout dataset from correlated samples can be reused in adaptive statistical learning, if the estimates are perturbed and coordinated using techniques developed for Bayesian di erential privacy, a privacy notion recently introduced by Yang et al. [42] to address correlations in a database. It has been observed by Kifer and Machanavajjhala [23] (see also [8, 20, 24, 26, 38, 44, 45] ) that di erential privacy may not work as expected when the data tuples are correlated. e underlying reason according to Zhao et al. [44] is that di erential privacy's guarantee masks only the presence of those records received from each user, but could not mask statistical trends that may reveal information about each user. Bayesian di erential privacy [42] broadens the application scenarios of di erential privacy when data records are correlated. For clarity, we defer the detailed de nition of Bayesian di erential privacy to Section 2.3. e rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss some preliminaries in Section 2, before presenting our results of adaptive statistical learning in Section 3. Section 4 provides experiments to support our results. We elaborate the proofs in Section 5. Section 6 surveys related work, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
PRELIMINARIES 2.1 Adaptive Statistical Learning
Dwork et al. [12] show that di erential privacy techniques can be leveraged in adaptive statistical learning for i.i.d. data samples. To this end, they introduce the notion of approximate max-information, establish a connection of di erential privacy to approximate maxinformation, and utilize this connection to present an algorithm for adaptive statistical learning.
For two random variables X and Y , let X × Y be the random variable obtained by drawing X and Y independently from their probability distributions, and let domain(X , Y ) be the domain of (X , Y ). Dwork et al. [12] de ne the notion of β-approximate max-information as follows:
where β > 0 and log means the binary logarithm. Approximate max-information gives generalization since it upper bounds the probability of "bad events" that can occur as a result of the dependence of the learning result Y (X ) on the dataset X ; see [12, Page 10] for more details. Speci cally, it is straightforward to obtain from (1) that if
Statistical learning considered in this paper is as follows: For an unknown distribution D over a discrete universe X of possible data points, a statistical query Q asks for the expected value of some function f : X → [0, 1] on random draws from D.
e goal is to ensure that the estimate obtained from data is close to the true result on the unknown distribution. We consider queries Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . that are chosen adaptively based on the results of prior estimates.
Di erential Privacy
A randomized algorithm Y satis es ϵ-di erential privacy (DP) if for all neighboring databases x and x that di er in one record, and for any subset Y of the output range of the mechanism Y , it holds that
To ensure ϵ-di erential privacy, the Laplace mechanism [16] and the exponential mechanism [28] have been proposed in the literature. e details are as follows.
• To achieve ϵ-di erential privacy for a query Q, the Laplace mechanism Lap(∆ Q /ϵ ) adds Laplace noise with parameter (i.e., scale) ∆ Q /ϵ independently to each dimension of the query result, where ∆ Q is the global sensitivity of query Q:
where databases x and x are neighboring if they di er in one record.
• To ensure ϵ-di erential privacy for a query Q, the exponential mechanism Expo(ϵ, u, R) for some utility function u and the output range R outputs an element ∈ R with probability proportional to exp
, where ∆ u is the sensitivity of u with respect to its database argument: ∆ u = max ∈R max neighboring x, x |u (x, )−u (x , )|, where databases x and x are neighboring if they di er in one record.
Although di erential privacy (DP) has been recognized as a powerful notion, it has been observed by Kifer and Machanavajjhala [23] (see also [8, 20, 24, 26, 38, 44, 45] ) that DP may not work as expected when the data tuples are correlated. As noted by Zhao et al. [44] , although DP ensures that a user's participation itself in the computation reveals no further secrets from the user, however, due to tuple correlation, a user's data may impact other users' records and hence has more in uence on the query response than what is expected compared with the case where tuples are independent. When correlations exist, a user's data is not known to the user alone in some degree, and an adversary may combine the query output and the correlation to learn about a user's data.
To extend di erential privacy for correlated data, prior studies have investigated various privacy metrics [8, 20, 24, 26, 38, 45] . One of the metrics receiving much a ention is the notion of Bayesian di erential privacy introduced by Yang et al. [42] as follows.
Bayesian Di erential Privacy
In this paper, we will establish a connection of Bayesian di erential privacy to approximate max-information and then leverage this connection to use Bayesian di erential privacy for adaptive statistical learning. We discuss Bayesian di erential privacy below.
e notion of Bayesian di erential privacy (BDP) is introduced by Yang et al. [42] to extend di erential privacy for addressing the case when data records are correlated. Before stating the de nition, we rst introduce some notation.
e database under consideration is modeled by a random variable X = [X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ], where X j for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} is a tuple, which is also a random variable. Let database x = [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ] be an instantiation of X , so that each x j denotes an instantiation of X j . Let i be the index of the tuple a acked by the adversary. For notational simplicity, x S and X S stand for [x j : j ∈ S] and [X j : j ∈ S] respectively for any set S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i}; i.e., x S is an instantiation of X S . An adversary denoted by A(i, S ) knows the values of all tuples in S (denoted by x S ) and a empts to a ack the value of tuple i (denoted by x i ). For a randomized perturbation mechanism Y that maps a database x to a randomized output , the Bayesian di erential privacy leakage (BDPL) of Y with respect to the adversary A(i, S ) is de ned by
where the subscript A is short for A(i, S ), and ln denotes the natural logarithm. In (3), x i and x i iterate through the domain of tuple X i (i.e., x i ∈ domain(X i ), x i ∈ domain(X i ), and x i x i ), and x S iterates through the domain of tuple(s) X S (i.e., x S ∈ domain(X S )), where X S and x S stand for [X j : j ∈ S] and [x j : j ∈ S] respectively for S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i}. In (3), Y iterates through all subsets of the output range of the mechanism Y . e mechanism Y satis es ϵ-Bayesian di erential privacy if
In (4), A (short for A(i, S )) iterates through the set of all adversaries; i.e., i iterates through the index set {1, . . . , n} and S iterates through all subsets of {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i}. Based on (2)-(4), Yang et al. [42] show that when all tuples are independent, (2) (i.e., DP guarantee) and (4) (i.e., BDP guarantee) are the same. However, under tuple correlations, (2) (i.e., DP guarantee) and (4) (i.e., BDP guarantee) are di erent due to the following reason [44] : although DP protects the information received from each user, an adversary may combine the correlations and the query response to obtain a large amount of information about the user. In other words, under DP, although the user itself is privacyaware in participating the database, the participations of other users together with the query response nevertheless leak the user's data.
e BDP notion ensures that even under tuple correlation, almost no sensitive information about any user can be leaked because of answering the query.
Mechanisms to Achieve Bayesian Di erential Privacy
Yang et al. [42] extend the Laplace mechanism [16] of di erential privacy to achieve Bayesian di erential privacy. However, this mechanism of [42] is only for the sum query on a Gaussian Markov random eld (GMRF) with positive correlations and its extension to a discrete domain, so it cannot apply to queries other than the sum query and cannot apply to correlations other than those of positivecorrelated GMRF. Recently, my co-authors and I [44] present mechanisms for arbitrary correlations by connecting Bayesian di erential privacy (BDP) to di erential privacy (DP). Speci cally, we [44] show that ϵ -DP implies ϵ-BDP, where ϵ depends on ϵ and the correlations between the data tuples. Note that although [44] uses the notion of dependent di erential privacy, this notion is equivalent to Bayesian di erential privacy. For clarity, we will present [44] 's results on the relationship between Bayesian di erential privacy (BDP) and di erential privacy (DP) as Lemmas 2-4 in Section 5.1 later. In order to state these results as well as our main results on adaptive statistical learning in Section 3, we rst review some preliminaries given in [44] .
Representing dependency structure of tuples of a database via probability graphical models. To represent dependency structure of tuples in a database, we [44] apply the wellknown notion called probability graphical model. ese models use graphs (i.e., networks) to express the conditional (in)dependencies between random variables. In our applications, each node stands for a tuple of the database (a tuple is also a random variable), and we have a network to represent the conditional (in)dependencies between tuples of the database.
A Bayesian network (which is a directed acyclic graph) and a Markov network (which is an undirected graph) are two kinds of probability graphical models that have been studied extensively and used in various applications [25] . A Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph which represents a factorization of the joint probability of all random variables. Speci cally, in a Bayesian network of n nodes {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n }, with PA i denoting the set of parents of node X i (i.e., each node of PA i points directly to node X i via a single directed edge), then the joint probability satis es
A Markov network represents (in)dependencies between random variables via an undirected graph which has the Markov property such that any two subsets of variables are conditionally independent given a separating subset; i.e., with A, B, C denoting three disjoint sets of nodes, if any path between any node a ∈ A and any node b ∈ B has to include at least one node in C (or there is simply no path between a ∈ A and b ∈ B), then A and B are conditionally independent given C.
Markov blanket. e notion of Markov blanket is standard in probability graphical models [25] . For a node X i , its Markov blanket X M i comprises the tuples that are directly correlated with tuple X i (i.e., given X M i which contains X j for j ∈ M i , X i is conditionally independent of everything else). If X i is independent of all other n − 1 tuples, then M i = ∅. In a Bayesian network, a node's Markov blanket consists of its parents, children, and its children's other Session 2: Privacy Preservation WPES'17, October 30, 2017, Dallas, TX, USA.
is gure from [44] is based on [38] . For a Markov chain X 1 → X 2 . . . → X n , moralization simply means making each directed edge undirected, since there are no nodes that have a common child. A Markov quilt for node X i is
e corresponding nearby set X N i and remote set X R i are
To check the de nition of a Markov quilt, it is straightforward to see that here any path between X i and a node in X R i has to include at least one node in X Q i . Both a and b above are positive integers. If a = 1 and b = 1, the Markov quilt becomes the Markov blanket X M i = {X i−1 , X i+1 } with the corresponding X N i being ∅. Note that any X term with an index outside of {1, 2, . . . , n} is canceled out; e.g., the Markov blanket X M 1 of node X 1 is actually {X 2 } rather than {X 0 , X 2 } since there is no node X 0 .
parents. In a Markov network (also known as a Markov random eld), the Markov blanket of a node is its set of neighboring nodes. Markov quilt. We [44] generalize the notion of Markov blanket to Markov quilt. is de nition is adopted from Song et al. [38] with slight changes. We consider a network of n nodes X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n . First, we perform moralization if necessary. In other words, for a Bayesian network, we moralize it into a Markov network; for a Markov network, no action is taken. Moralization means making each directed edge undirected and pu ing an edge between any two nodes that have a common child. Recall that X S represents the set of nodes with indicies in an index set S, where S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}; i.e. X S = {X j : j ∈ S }. Let Q i and R i be disjoint subsets of {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i}. We say a set X Q i of nodes is a Markov quilt of node X i if a er moralization (whenever necessary) of the dependency network, for any node X j in X R i , either any path between X i and X j has to include at least one node in X Q i , or there is simply no path between X i and X j . We emphasize that this denition is de ned on a Markov network or a er we have moralized a Bayesian network into a Markov network. e de nition implies that X R i is independent of X i conditioning on X Q i . Excluding X i , X Q i and X R i , we de ne the remaining nodes as X N i ; i.e., X Q i , X N i ,
separates X i and X R i , so X R i is remote from X i while X N i is nearby from X i (this is why we use the notation R and N ). We refer to X N i (resp., X R i ) as the nearby set (resp., the remote set) associated with the Markov quilt X Q i . Note that when we de ne a Markov quilt X Q i for node X i , we actually have a triple (X Q i , X N i , X R i ): a Markov quilt X Q i , a nearby set X N i , and a remote set X R i . Figure 1 provides an illustration of X Q i , X R i , and X N i on a Markov chain. Clearly, for a node, its Markov blanket is a special Markov quilt. Yet, while a node has only one Markov blanket, a node may have many di erent Markov quilts, as presented in Figure 1 .
Max-in uence. To quantify how much changing a tuple can impact other tuples, very recently, Song et al. [38] de ne the max-in uence of a variable X i on a set of variables X S (i.e., the set of X j for j ∈ S) for S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} \ {i} as follows:
We [44] generalize this de nition to describe the max-in uence of X i on a set of variables X S conditioning on a set of variables X K as follows (S and K are disjoint subsets of {1, . . . , n} \ {i}):
In (5) and (6), X S and x S stand for [X j : j ∈ S] and [x j : j ∈ S] respectively for S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} \ {i}; similarly, X K and
We also have that S and K are disjoint subsets of {1, . . . , n} \ {i}); x i and x i iterate through the domain of tuple X i (i.e., x i ∈ domain(X i ), x i ∈ domain(X i ), and x i x i ); x S iterates through the domain of tuple(s) X S (i.e., x S ∈ domain(X S )); and x K iterates through the domain of tuple(s) X K (i.e., x K ∈ domain(X K )). Based on (6), I (X S X i | X K ) equals 0 if and only if X S is independent of X i conditioning on X K , given the following:
• On the one hand, if X S is independent of X i conditioning on
, any x i , any x S , and any x K (i.e., only if X S is independent of X i conditioning on X K ).
In (6), we note that S and K are disjoint subsets of {1, . . . , n} \ {i}. Also, for generality, if
THE RESULTS
Our algorithm for adaptive statistical learning with correlated samples is presented as Algorithm 1 (based on [12] ), which tackles adaptive queries Q 1 , Q 2 , . . ., each with global sensitivity upper bounded by ∆ Q . e queries Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . are chosen adaptively based on the results of prior estimates. We use Algorithm 1 to enable validation of an analyst's queries in the adaptive se ing. As will become clear,
and thus is ϵ -Bayesian di erential private for ϵ de ned in Lemma 2 or Lemma 3 on Page 6 later with the above ϵ. For an unknown distribution D over a discrete universe X of possible data points, a statistical query Q asks for the expected value of some Algorithm 1 A generalization-achieving algorithm (based on [12] if B < 1 then
5:
output "⊥";
6:
let B ← B − 1 and T ← T + Lap(σ );
10:
11:
output Q i (D);
13:
end if 14: end if
It follows that ∆ Q = 1/n for a statistical query [3, 12, 13] .
. . , X n ] denote the holdout dataset drawn randomly from a distribution P. Consider an analyst that is given access to the training dataset D and selects statistical queries Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . adaptively while interacting with Algorithm 1 which is given holdout dataset X , training dataset D, noise rate σ , budget B, threshold T . If
then for arbitrary correlations between data samples, we have
where a i
being the Markov blanket of X i , and
ln max
. In the expression of a i , the records x i and x i iterate through the domain of tuple X i (i.e., x i ∈ domain(X i ), x i ∈ domain(X i ), and x i x i ), and x M i iterates through the domain of tuple(s) X M i with X M i being the Markov blanket of X i . In n # (·) of (8), note that we can let X Q i iterate through just an arbitrary set containing some Markov quilts of X i , rather than iterating through the set of all Markov quilts of X i , since le ing X Q i iterate a smaller set can only induce a larger (or the same) bound in (8) . In addition, as explained on Page 4, when we de ne a Markov quilt X Q i for node X i , the nearby set X N i is also determined; i.e., N i is also determined. Given N i , the set L in the de nition of b i iterates all subsets of N i . In the expression of
en for arbitrary correlations between data samples, we have P ∃i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} :
for n≥ n # B,
where n # (·) is de ned in (8) × ln m β when the correlations between data samples are modeled by a Markov chain, by introducing just a small additional expense (i.e., the factor ln(1/τ )).
We present in eorem 3 below that ϵ-Bayesian di erential privacy implies a bound on approximate max-information.
. . , X n ] be the statistical database under consideration, and Y be an ϵ-Bayesian di erential private algorithm. en for any β > 0, it holds that I β ∞ (X ; Y (X )) ≤ 2ϵ 2 n + ϵ 2n ln(2/β ) log e, where log means the binary logarithm. eorem 3 will be proved in Appendix A.1 on Page 11. eorem 19 of Dwork et al. [12] give a simple bound ϵn log e that is weaker than that of our eorem 3. In Appendix A.2 on Page 12, we will use eorem 3 above to obtain the following Lemma 1 on generalization bounds. L 1. Let X be a random database chosen according to distribution P, and Y be an ϵ-Bayesian di erential private algorithm for query Q with global sensitivity ∆ Q . Let Y (P) be the expectation of Y (X ). From Lemma 1, for a statistical query [3, 12, 13] 
We use Lemma 1 in the proofs of eorems 1 and 2 for quantifying the number of samples needed to bound the generalization error.
EXPERIMENTS OF ADAPTIVE STATISTICAL LEARNING
We provide experiments on synthetic data to support our result of adaptive statistical learning that reuses a holdout dataset with tuple correlations. e goal of the analyst is build a linear threshold classi er, which is the same as [12] . We do not repeat the details of the classi er of [12] here. e label is randomly selected from {−1, 1} and the a ributes are generated such that they are correlated with the label and also correlated among themselves. Figures 2 and  3 illustrate that reusing a holdout dataset in the common way can lead to over ing, and that over ing is prevented by our approach based on Bayesian di erential privacy (BDP).
PROOFS 5.1 Useful Lemmas
Below we state several lemmas that will be used later to prove the theorems. Lemmas 2 and 3 below present the relationship between Bayesian di erential privacy (BDP) and di erential privacy (DP) when the tuple correlations can be arbitrary. Lemma 4 provides the corresponding result when the tuple correlations are modeled by a time-homogeneous Markov chain.
L 2 ([44]). For a database with arbitrary tuple correlations, it holds that
ϵ-Bayesian di erential privacy ⇐= ϵ -di erential privacy for ϵ = min i ∈ {1,2, ...,n } max X Q i : a Markov quilt of X i X N i : the nearby set associated with
, the meanings of a Markov quilt and its associated nearby set have been elaborated on Page 4, and X Q i in (10) can iterate through the set of all Markov quilts of X i , or just an arbitrary set containing some Markov quilts of X i . Note that we can let X Q i iterate through just an arbitrary set containing some Markov quilts of X i , rather than iterating through the set of all Markov quilts of X i , since (i) based on (10), le ing X Q i iterate a smaller set cannot make ϵ larger (i.e., it either induces a smaller ϵ or does not change ϵ ), and (ii) ϵ * -di erential privacy with a smaller ϵ * implies ϵ # -di erential privacy with a larger ϵ # . In addition, as explained on Page 4, when we de ne a Markov quilt X Q i for node X i , the nearby set X N i is also determined; i.e., N i is also determined. Given N i , the set L in the de nition of b i iterates all subsets of N i .
L 3 ([44]
). Le ing X Q i in (10) take just the Markov blanket of X i since the Markov blanket is a special case of the Markov quilt as discussed on Page 4, we can replace (10) by ϵ-Bayesian di erential privacy ⇐= ϵ -di erential privacy
L 4 ([44])
. Consider a database with tuples modeled by a time-homogeneous Markov chain X 1 → X 2 → . . . → X n that is also aperiodic, irreducible and reversible. For this Markov chain, let be the spectral gap of the transition matrix; i.e., equals 1 − max{|λ 2 |, |λ 3 |, . . . , |λ n |} with the eigenvalues of the transition matrix in non-increasing order being λ 1 ≥ λ 2 ≥ . . . ≥ λ n , where λ 1 = 1. Let ρ be the probability of the least probable state in the stationary distribution of the Markov chain; i.e., ρ equals min j ∈S d j with vector [d j : j ∈ S] denoting the stationary distribution and S denoting the state space. Let c be an arbitrary constant satisfying 0 < c < 1/6.
ρ (e c ϵ −1) , t def = 1 ln 1 ρ and ξ t +1
for n ≥ 2d, ϵ-Bayesian di erential privacy is implied by h(ϵ, , ρ)-di erential privacy, where
Proof of eorem 1 on Page 5
For an unknown distribution D over a discrete universe X of possible data points, a statistical query Q asks for the expected value of some function f : X → [0, 1] on random draws from D. On a database of n records, the global sensitivity of a statistical query Q is ∆ Q = 1/n. Substituting ∆ Q = 1/n into Lemma 1 on Page 5, we obtain that under ϵ-Bayesian di erential privacy, if ϵ ≤ τ /3, then
. Hence, to induce the desired Session 2: Privacy Preservation WPES'17, October 30, 2017, Dallas, TX, USA.
in eorem 1, we ensure ϵ ≤ τ /3 and 4e −τ 2 n/9 ≤ β. From [12, 17] , Algorithm 1 on Page 5 is ϵ * -di erential private for ϵ * = B∆ Q · 1 σ + 1
4σ . e above result and Lemma 2 together imply that Algorithm 1 is ϵ-Bayesian di erential private for ϵ = min
In addition, the condition 4e −τ 2 n/9 ≤ β implies
en with n # (B, σ , τ , β ) de ned as the maximum of the right hand sides of (12) and (13), we obtain that n ≥ n # (B, σ , τ , β ) su ces. We can also apply Lemma 3 instead of Lemma 2. In this case, (12) is replaced by
which together with (13) implies that n ≥ n * (B, σ , τ , β ) su ces.
Proof of eorem 2 on Page 5
We prove eorem 2 using the technique similar to that of [12, eorem 25] . For notation convenience in the analysis, we write " T ← T + Lap(σ )" in Lines 2 and 9 of Algorithm 1 as " T ← T + δ i ", where δ i denotes Lap(σ ); i.e., δ i is a fresh Laplace noise with parameter (i.e., scale) σ . Also, we write Q i (X ) + Lap(σ 2 ) in Line 10 of Algorithm 1 as Q i (X ) + ξ i , where ξ i denotes Lap(σ 2 ); i.e., ξ i is a fresh Laplace noise with parameter σ 2 . With the above changes, we restate Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 (Restated).
A generalization-achieving algorithm (based on [12] ) for adaptive queries Q 1 , Q 2 , . . ., each with global sensitivity upper bounded by ∆ Q . output "⊥";
let γ i ← Lap(σ 3 );
8:
let B ← B − 1 and T ← T + δ i , where δ i ← Lap(σ );
10:
output Q i (X ) + ξ i , where ξ i ← Lap(σ 2 );
13:
15: end for
Recall that a i denotes the answer of Algorithm 1 on statistical query Q i . In the result that we desire to prove, we bound the error between a i and Q i (P). is error can be decomposed as the di erence between a i and Q i (X ), and the di erence between Q i (X ) and Q i (P). More speci cally, it holds that
A more formal reasoning that uses the union bound to establish (14) is presented below, where A means the complement of event A. We have
To bound the second term in (15), we use eorem 1 to obtain for every i :
where "for every i" means "i ∈ {1, . . . , m}" (note that m is the number of queries answered). en (16) and the union bound together imply
, where "∃i" means "∃i ∈ {1, . . . , m}". Below we bound the rst term in (15) by analyzing Algorithm 1. For the answer a i that is di erent from ⊥, we bound the rst term in (15) by considering two cases of Algorithm 1. First, if Line 10 of Algorithm 1 is executed, then a i = Q i (X ) + ξ i and
Summarizing the two cases above, we obtain
where the last step uses T = 
where the last step uses 3+c 16 ≥ 1−c 12 . en (19) and the union bound yield
To bound P ∃i : |δ i | + |γ i | ≥ 1−c 4 τ , we use the union bound to derive
Since δ i obeys a Laplace distribution with parameter σ , and γ i obeys a Laplace distribution with parameter 2σ , then given σ = (1−c )τ 12 ln(4m/β ) , we obtain for every i :
and for every i :
en using the union bound together with (22) and (23), we have
and
Applying (24) and (25) to (21), we derive
Substituting (20) and (26) into (18), we obtain
Using (17) and (27) in (15), we have
if n ≥ n # B, σ ,
To complete the proof, we will show that Z i < B is a subevent of
where
over ing. For every j ≤ i that reduces the budget B in Algorithm 1 (i.e., Line 9 of Algorithm 1 is executed), it follows that
en applying T = 1+c 2 τ , |δ j | < 1−c 12 τ , |γ j | < 1−c 6 τ and |Q j (P) − Q j (X )| < 1−c 4 τ to (29), we nd
Hence, if Z i < B, then the budget B in Algorithm 1 is still at least 1, and hence a i ⊥. is along with (28) implies that
Given the condition σ =
(1−c )τ 12 ln(4m/β ) and n # (·) de ned in eorem 1, we obtain from (30) that
Hence, we have proved the result for arbitrary correlations between data samples in eorem 2. Now we establish the result of in eorem 2 when the Markov chain represents the correlations between data samples: on a time-homogeneous Markov chain that is also aperiodic, irreducible and reversible, the condition on n in Session 2: Privacy Preservation WPES'17, October 30, 2017, Dallas, TX, USA.
· ln m β . To this end, given (31), then with ϵ being τ /3, we will evaluate
As shown in Lemma 2 on Page 6 above, ϵ-Bayesian di erential privacy is implied by ϵ -di erential privacy, for ϵ . On a time-homogeneous Markov chain X 1 → X 2 → . . . → X n that is also aperiodic, irreducible and reversible, the quantity ρ > 0 is the probability of the least probable state in the stationary distribution of the Markov chain; i.e., ρ equals min j ∈S d j with vector [d j : j ∈ S] denoting the stationary distribution and S denoting the state space.
e term is the spectral gap of the transition matrix; i.e., equals 1 − max{|λ 2 |, |λ 3 |, . . . , |λ n |} with the eigenvalues of the transition matrix in non-increasing order being λ 1 ≥ λ 2 ≥ . . . ≥ λ n , where λ 1 = 1. en Lemma 4 on Page 6 above shows that ϵ above can be replaced by h(ϵ, , ρ) as follows:
ρ (e c ϵ −1) and s
ρ (e ϵ /6 −1)
. We further
Given ϵ = τ /3, 0 < τ ≤ 1, 0 < c < 1/6, we have cϵ < ϵ/6 ≤ τ /18 ≤ 1/18, implying e cϵ < e ϵ /6 ≤ e 1/18 . en it holds that ≤ ln 4 ϵ /6 = ln 24 ϵ = ln 72 τ . e application of these to (34) and (35) 
and s ≤ 1 ln
Using (36) and (37) in (33), we get
Ignoring the constants in (38), we have
As noted, h(ϵ, , ρ) is a lower bound of ϵ , which implies that 1/[h(ϵ, , ρ)] is an upper bound of 1/ϵ (i.e., the term in (32)). en from (39) , the term in (32) can be expressed as O 1 τ ln 1 τ . From ϵ = τ /3, this means that n speci ed in (31) 
Hence, the proof of eorem 2 is now completed.
RELATED WORK
In many practical applications, statistical learning is o en adaptivethe queries on a dataset depend on previous interactions with the same dataset. However, generalization guarantees are traditionally given in a non-adaptive model. Recent studies by Hardt and Ullman [19] as well as Dwork et al. [12] [13] [14] provide generalization bounds in adaptive statistical learning, while Dwork et al. [12] [13] [14] also propose mechanisms via di erential privacy and max-information. Di erential privacy means that an adversary given access to the output does not have much con dence to determine whether the output was sampled from the probability distribution generated by the algorithm under a database x or under a neighboring database x that di ers from x in one record. Speci cally, a randomized algorithm Y satis es ϵ-di erential privacy if for all neighboring databases x, x and any subset Y of the ouput range of the mecha-
. e notion of max-information gives generalization since it upper bounds the probability of "bad events" that can occur as a result of the dependence of the output variable Y (X ) on the input variable X . Rogers et al. [33] show the connection between approximate di erential privacy and max-information, and prove that the connection holds only for data drawn from product distributions, where approximate di erential privacy (ADP) [15] relaxes di erential privacy so that (ϵ, δ )-ADP means the probabilities that the same output is seen on neighboring databases x and x (di ering in one record) is bounded by a factor e ϵ , in addition to a small additive probability δ ; i.e., P [Y (x ) ∈ Y] ≤ e ϵ P [Y (x ) ∈ Y] + δ for any subset Y of the ouput range of the mechanism Y . Very recently, Bassily and Freund [3] propose an algorithmic stability notion called typical stability which provides generalization for a broader class of queries than that of bounded-sensitivity queries (bounded sensitivity is o en required by di erential privacy). Typical stability means that the output of a query is "well-concentrated" around its expectation with respect to the underlying distribution on the dataset. Cummings et al. [10] introduce di erent generalization notions and discuss their relationships with di erential privacy. Russo and Zou [34] present a mutual-information framework for adaptive statistical learning and compare it with max-information. Blum and Hardt [5] design an algorithm to maintain an accurate leaderboard for machine learning competitions (such as those organized by Kaggle Inc. at h p://www.kaggle.com/ ), where submissions can be adaptive.
Since di erential privacy was proposed to quantify privacy analysis [11, 16] , this notion has received much a ention in the literature [4, 22, 32, 37, 39] . Kifer and Machanavajjhala [23] observe that di erential privacy may not work well when the data tuples are correlated in between. To generalize di erential privacy, Kifer and Machanavajjhala [24] introduce the Pu er sh framework by considering the generation of the database and the adversarial belief about the database. A subclass of the Pu er sh framework, called the Blow sh framework, is investigated by He et al. [20] . Blow sh privacy imposes deterministic policy constraints rather than probabilistic correlations to model adversarial knowledge. A general mechanism to achieve Pu er sh privacy is recently proposed by Song et al. [38] . Xiao and Xiong [41] incorporate temporal correlations into di erential privacy in the context of location privacy. Chen et al. [8] and Zhu et al. [45] give di erent algorithms for privacy under data correlations. To improve the utilities of these algorithms, Liu et al. [26] present a Laplace mechanism that handles pairwise correlations. Yang et al. [42] consider di erent adversary models and formalize the notion of Bayesian di erential privacy that tackles tuple correlations as well. Yang et al. [42] further introduce a mechanism that is only for the sum query on a Gaussian Markov random eld with positive correlations and its extension to a discrete domain. For Bayesian di erential privacy, Zhao et al. [44] present mechanisms for databases with arbitrary tuple correlations and elaborate the case of tuple correlations being modeled by a Markov chain.
CONCLUSION
Recently, Dwork et al. [12] [13] [14] show that the holdout dataset from i.i.d. data samples can be reused in adaptive statistical learning, if the estimates are perturbed and coordinated using techniques developed for di erential privacy, which is a widely used notion to de ne privacy. Yet, the results of Dwork et al. [12] [13] [14] are applicable to only the case of i.i.d. samples. In this paper, we show that Bayesian di erential privacy can be used to ensure statistical validity in adaptive statistical learning, where Bayesian di erential privacy is introduced by Yang et al. [42] to extend di erential privacy for addressing the case when data records are correlated. Speci cally, we prove that the holdout dataset from correlated samples can be reused in adaptive statistical learning, if the estimates are perturbed and coordinated using techniques satisfying Bayesian di erential privacy. Our results generalize those of Dwork et al. [12] [13] [14] for i.i.d. samples to arbitrarily correlated data.
To begin with, we rst de ne martingale and Doob martingale that will be used in the proof of eorem 3. A sequence of random variables Z 0 , Z 1 , . . . is referred to as a martingale [9] 
. ., where E[·] stands for the expected value of a random variable. A Doob martingale [9] is a martingale constructed using the following general approach. Let X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X m be a sequence of random variables, and let Y be a random variable with
en the sequence consisting of Z i = E[Y |X 0 , . . . , X i ] for i = 0, 1, . . . , m gives a Doob martingale. Note that in the expression Z i = E[Y |X 0 , . . . , X i ], the expectation is only taken over X i+1 , X i+2 , . . . , X m while X 0 , . . . , X i are kept as random variables, so Z i is still a random variable.
e Azuma-Hoe ding inequality (see Lemma 2 of [6] ) presented below is widely used in the analysis of martingales.
We now continue the proof of eorem 3. We rst x ∈ Y, and de ne a function (x )
. For function , we will de ne a Doob martingale Z i | i=0, ...,n with respect to X i | i=1, ...,n . Speci cally, we de ne
for i = 0, . . . , n; i.e., given x 1 , . . . , x i , we take the expectation of (x 1 , . . . , x i , X i+1 , . . . , X n ) with respect to X i+1 , . . . , X n , and obtain Z i (x 1 , . . . , x i ). For simplicity, we write the sequence X i+1 , . . . , X n as X i+1:n , and write the sequence x 1 , . . . , x i as x 1:i , and so on. en 
To nd the connection between (41) and (42), we rst note P x i , x i+1:n | x 1:i−1 = P x i+1:n | x 1:i−1 , x i · P x i | x 1:i−1 by the chain rule; put it in detail, we have P[Y (x 1:i −1 ,x i ,X i +1:n )= ] ≤ e ϵ , which with (46) and (47) implies (45) . Since (45) holds for any x i , we then obtain |Z i −Z i−1 | ≤ ϵ from (40) and (44) . Since i can iterate through {1, . . . , n}, we have proved |Z i − Z i−1 | ≤ ϵ for i = 1, . . . , n. en we use the Azuma-Hoe ding inequality (i.e., Lemma 5 above) and obtain P [Z n − Z 0 ≥ t] ≤ exp −t 2 2nϵ 2 for any t > 0. By de nition, Z n (x 1:n ) = (x 1:n ) = (x ) and Z 0 = E X 1:n [ (X 1:n )] = E X [ (X )]. Hence, it follows that
(48)
We now evaluate E X [ (X )] as follows.
Since the natural logarithm ln is a convex function, we use Jensen's inequality to obtain
Using (50) in (49), we have E X [ (X )] ≤ 0, which along with (48) further yields
For an integer i ≥ 1, we de ne t i def = 2ϵ 2 n + ϵ 2n ln(2 i /β ) and
. By Bayes' rule, for every x ∈ B i , it holds that
erefore, we obtain from (51) and (52) that
An immediate implication of (53) is that 
and hence by (55) we get
is, by Lemma 6 below (i.e., [12, Lemma 18] ), gives that I β ∞ (X ; Y ) ≤ log exp(t 1 ) = t 1 log e = 2ϵ 2 n + ϵ 2n ln(2/β ) log e, where log means the binary logarithm. 18] ). Let X and Y be two random variables over the same domain X. If P x ∼p (X )
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1 on Page 5
We let X × Y be the random variable obtained by drawing X and Y independently from their probability distributions. We also de ne O as the event that |Y (X ) − Y (P)| ≥ τ . First, we use the con- 
Suppose ϵ ≤ aτ /(n∆ Q ) and β = 2e −bτ 2 /(n ·∆ Q 2 ) for some constants a and b that will be speci ed later. en we obtain from (58) that
To ensure 2a 2 +a √ 2b − 1/2 < 0 which implies 2a 2 < 1/2 so that a < 1/2, we set a = 1/3 for simplicity. en 2a 2 +a ≤ 4e
−τ 2 /(9n ·∆ Q
